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ALD-019         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3515 
 ___________ 
 
THOMAS I. GAGE, 
                                          Appellant 
v. 
 
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA;  
FRANK J. PROVENZANO, SOMERSET COUNTY SHERIFF; 
HON. MARY C. JACOBSON 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00862) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
 Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 20, 2011 
 Before:   SLOVITER, FISHER AND WEIS, Circuit Judges 







  In February, 2011, Thomas I. Gage filed a pro se complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and 
Sheriff Frank J. Provenzano, seeking to challenge a foreclosure judgment entered in state 
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court and Wells Fargo’s subsequent purchase of the foreclosed property.  Gage claims 
that the foreclosure on his residential property was “criminal” and violated his federal 
rights.   
  On August 8, 2011, while his complaint was pending, Gage was evicted 
from the property pursuant to a writ of possession issued by the New Jersey Superior 
Court.  Gage then filed an “emergency motion” in the District Court on August 11, 2011, 
arguing that any action taken with respect to the foreclosed property is unlawful because, 
among other things, defendants have no jurisdiction while his federal complaint remains 
pending given that Gage requested a stay in his complaint of further action by defendants.   
  By order entered September 9, 2011, the District Court denied Gage’s 
emergency motion, and also granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss the claims against it 
as barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and afforded Sheriff Provenzano time to 
respond to Gage’s motion for default judgment.  Gage appeals the September 9 order. 
  We will exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review the 
denial of Gage’s emergency motion, as Gage sought, in essence, a preliminary injunction 
to prevent defendants from taking further action with regard to the foreclosed property.
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  As mentioned, the September 9, 2011, order also granted Wells Fargo’s motion to 
dismiss and afforded Sheriff Provenzano time to respond to the motion for default 
judgment.  We lack jurisdiction at this time to review those portions of the District 
Court’s order.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction to review “final decisions,” 
which in general are decisions that “completely end[] the litigation and leave[] nothing 
for the court to do but execute its judgment.”  In re Carco Elecs., 536 F.3d 211, 213 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Although Gage’s claims against Wells Fargo have been dismissed, as have 
the claims that he sought to add against the Honorable Mary C. Jacobson, the claims 
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“We generally review a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of 
discretion but review the underlying factual findings for clear error and examine legal 
conclusions de novo.”  Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009).   
  A preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show: (1) a likelihood of 
success on the merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; 
(3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving 
party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.  Minard Run Oil Co. v. United 
States Forest Serv., --- F.3d ---, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19265, at *26 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 
2011).  A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy,” NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-
Mar Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999), and the burden rests with the moving 
party to demonstrate entitlement to such relief.  Id. 
  We conclude that the District Court properly denied Gage’s injunction 
request.  Gage has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits, and the District 
Court did not err in refusing to enjoin further action by defendants in light of its dismissal 
of Gage’s claims against Wells Fargo under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Lawrence 
v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “claims seeking injunctive 
relief are barred by Rooker-Feldman if they necessarily require the federal court to 
determine that a state court judgment was erroneously entered”).  Defendants here have 
acted pursuant to orders entered by the New Jersey courts.  Our independent review of 
                                                                                                                                                             
against Sheriff Provenzano remain pending.  Absent entry of a final decision as to all 
claims against all parties, our jurisdiction over the present appeal is limited to the denial 
of Gage’s request for injunctive relief.      
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the complaint and Gage’s other pleadings of record reveals no indication that his 
numerous, vaguely supported claims for relief are likely to result in a judgment on the 
merits in his favor.  Nor has Gage satisfied the remaining factors for a preliminary 
injunction. 
  Gage argues that his pending complaint with its request for a “stay” 
deprives defendants and the New Jersey courts of authority to take action against the 
subject property.  Docket # 17 at 3-4.  However, absent an express order from the District 
Court enjoining the state court proceedings or action by defendants, there is no provision 
in the law for an automatic stay or injunction upon the mere filing of a federal civil rights 
suit. Gage also complains that the District Court erred by not acting sooner on the stay 
request embodied in his complaint, but Gage himself failed adequately to alert the 
District Court to his request for immediate relief by not filing a separate motion for a 
preliminary injunction at the time he filed the complaint.  We discern no error in the 
District Court’s disposition of Gage’s request for injunctive relief.      
  Based on the foregoing, we will summarily affirm the September 9, 2011, 
order denying Gage’s emergency motion.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4.  Gage’s pending motion 
in this Court for a stay and immediate return of the foreclosed property is denied. 
 
